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Abstract
We study optimal commodity taxes in the presence of non-linear income taxes
when agents differ in skills and tastes for consumption. We show that commod-
ity taxes are partly determined by a many-person Ramsey rule when there is taste
heterogeneity within income classes. The usual role of consumption taxes in relax-
ing incentive constraints explains the remaining part of these taxes when there is
taste heterogeneity between income classes. We quantify the importance of these
two components on Canadian microdata using a new method to identify empirically
the binding incentive constraints. Incentives matter but tax exemptions are mostly
justified by Ramsey considerations.
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1 Introduction
One common way of easing the fiscal burden on those in need is to make necessities tax-free
or tax them at a lower rate than luxuries. Whether commodity taxes should be used in this
way as part of the progressivity of the overall tax system is, however, subject to continued
debate in public finance. In a second-best world, in the case where social tastes for redis-
tribution are ordered from the rich to the poor, the many-person Ramsey rule derived by
Diamond and Mirrlees [14] does indeed recommend that the demand for the goods preferred
by the poor be less-heavily discouraged by taxes. However, this recommendation only ap-
plies when there is no income taxation. In the more relevant case where the government can
also apply a general non-linear income tax, the redistribution from rich to poor can partly
be effected via direct income taxes and transfers. The classic analysis of Atkinson and
Stiglitz [2] and its generalization by Mirrlees [22] demonstrated that commodity taxation is
then needed to relax the incentive constraints implied by any imperfect information about
taxpayers. If labor skill, for example, is private information to taxpayers, redistribution
from high- (rich) to low-skill (poor) individuals will involve high taxes on necessities when
these taxes help to discourage the high-skilled from reducing their labor effort. Of course,
the low-skilled also suffer from a greater tax burden but they may gain from the greater
scope for income redistribution.
In the existing literature there is a suspicion that the role of commodity taxes delineated
by Atkinson and Stiglitz [2] and Mirrlees [22] is bound up with the restrictive modeling
assumption that labor skill is the only dimension in which agents differ. The early contri-
butions of Cremer and Gahvari [7] and [8] have indeed shown that non-linear commodity
taxes might play a redistributive role when there is heterogeneity in consumption tastes, as
well as labor skill, although non-linear income taxation is also available. The current paper
analyzes the respective roles of indirect linear commodity taxation and direct non-linear
income taxation when agents differ in terms of both labor skill and consumption tastes.
Its main purpose is to study whether heterogeneity in consumption tastes, as well as labor
skill, may save some version of the many-person Ramsey rule.
Much effort has recently been expended on the optimal shape of linear commodity taxes
when individuals differ in two private-information dimensions: see in particular Cremer,
Pestieau and Rochet [9] and [10], Saez [24], Diamond [12], Blomquist and Christiansen [3],
Kaplow [20], Diamond and Spinnewijn [15] or Golosov, Troshkin, Tsyvinski and Weinzierl
[18]. This literature does not provide any justification for the heavy taxation of luxuries
based on many-person Ramsey rule considerations, and rather underlines that the role of
commodity taxes in relaxing incentive constraints continues instead to apply in this more
general framework. Our paper highlights that this role for commodity taxes relies on the
assumption that different types of agents pay different income taxes. This full flexibility
of the income tax schedule is open to question. It is known from Rochet and Chone´
[23] that more than one dimension of individual heterogeneity will likely yield bunching in
income taxes where different types of agents have the same pre- and post-tax incomes. This
flexibility assumption will also not hold when income is determined by a limited number
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of occupations or jobs, as in the literature following Diamond [13]. When there are only
a limited number of income classes relative to the total number of different taste types,
some agents with different tastes will necessarily be grouped together in the same income
class. Income taxation can be used to address heterogeneity between income classes, but
is obviously no help for the finer redistribution within income classes: this role is taken up
by commodity taxation. Our main theoretical result is to show that commodity taxes are
then partly shaped by a version of the many-person Ramsey rule: taxes are determined by
the relationship between consumption and consumers’ social valuations within each income
class.
The closest papers to ours are Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] and Diamond and
Spinnewijn [15]. Using a Lagrangian approach, Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] derive
an optimal rule whereby commodity taxes only depend on the ‘incremental net demand
of mimickers’, which is defined as the difference between the consumption of mimickers
and mimicked agents. They show that the demand for a given commodity should be
discouraged when mimickers consume more of this commodity than do the mimicked. For
example, groceries should be heavily taxed if the rich (mimickers) like them to the extent
that they would have relatively high grocery consumption even with the lower income of
the poor (who are the mimicked here). Diamond and Spinnewijn [15] consider a dynamic
setup where labor income is determined by occupation. Assuming that impatient high-
earners, who have a taste for early consumption, are ready to mimic low-earners, the
‘incremental net demand of mimickers’ rule recommends subsidizing the savings of low-
earners. One particular feature of the optimal tax system in Diamond and Spinnewijn [15]
is to complement this subsidy by a tax on high-earners’ savings. This additional tax is seen
as a way of relaxing the incentive constraints. Taxing the savings of the rich redistributes
welfare from the patient to the impatient rich, and hence raises the welfare of potential
mimickers (the impatient rich) if they do not reduce their labor effort.
Our paper shows that this additional tax on the savings of the rich in fact can be viewed
as part of a many-person Ramsey rule. Commodity taxes allow the government to carry
out a finer redistribution between patient and impatient agents within rich and poor income
classes. Since there cannot be incentive problems within an income class, the forces identi-
fied by Atkinson and Stiglitz [2] and Mirrlees [22] are irrelevant within an income class. This
produces commodity taxes that are shaped by the individual heterogeneity that remains
within income classes, namely the relationship between the consumption and the social
valuations of patient and impatient consumers. Later consumption will be discouraged by
a tax on savings when impatient agents are socially favored.
We use a method related to that in Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] in an occupational
setup that generalizes Diamond and Spinnewijn [15]. Unlike Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet
[9] we solve for a dual program allowing for a separate treatment of commodity taxes and
labor supply, extending Laroque [21] and Gauthier and Laroque [17] to introduce greater
individual heterogeneity. Our program yields a necessary condition for optimal indirect
taxes given any arbitrary (and possibly sub-optimal) pre-tax income distribution. This
condition can be written in two different ways. The first corresponds to the standard many-
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person Ramsey rule, once agents’ social weights are suitably redefined. Following Diamond
[11], agents’ social weights are usually defined in the main literature as the change in social
welfare from an income transfer to this agent in the absence of incentive issues. In our
setup the social valuation of an agent also incorporates an incentive component, as income
transfers render the allocations of agents who benefit from the transfer more desirable to
those who envy this allocation. Some social cost is to be borne to avoid violations of
incentive requirements: from a pure incentive viewpoint it is on the contrary preferable in
a social-welfare sense to reduce income transfers to envied (mimicked) agents. The relevant
weight in the many-person Ramsey rule turns out to be the ‘intrinsic’ social weight used by
Diamond [11] net of an adjustment relating to incentives. This new social weight, which we
call the ‘consolidated’ weight, is lower than Diamond’s typical intrinsic social weight when
incentive considerations are present; it can also even be negative, as is sometimes found in
the empirical literature on the estimation of social weights consistent with the many-person
Ramsey rule (see, for example, Ahmad and Stern [1]).
The second reading of this condition follows from the separation the two components
of the consolidated social weights. This yields another formulation of the optimal indirect-
taxation rule that mixes together a many-person Ramsey rule using Diamond’s typical
intrinsic social weights, and an incentive-component element referring to the incremental
net demand of mimickers. This formulation reveals that the usefulness of indirect taxes is
related to taste heterogeneity in two different ways. First, indirect taxes are determined
by a many-person Ramsey rule when agents in the same occupation or income class have
different consumption tastes. Second, indirect taxes are useful when agents in different
income classes also have different tastes, as they allow the tax authorities to relax incentive
constraints.
The main lesson from our theoretical analysis therefore is that heterogeneity within in-
come classes can justify the discouragement of the consumption of those with low intrinsic
weights, even in the presence of a general non-linear income tax. Commodity taxation
then reinforces the progressivity of the tax system by addressing taste heterogeneity within
income classes, while the income tax itself instead deals with between-class income hetero-
geneity.
Our empirical illustration on Canadian consumption microdata identifies groups of
agents with the same preferences by appealing to the nonparametric revealed preferences
clustering in Crawford and Pendakur [6]. The assumption that the Federal Good and Ser-
vices Tax (GST) is set optimally yields estimates for the groups’ consolidated social weights.
We provide evidence of considerable variation in consolidated social weights across taste
groups. All these weights turn out to be positive, except for rich urban households consist-
ing of old individuals living in West Canada.
The recovery of the intrinsic social weights requires the identification of the relevant
incentive constraints, reflecting the existence of private information, at the disaggregated
taste× occupation level. The existing empirical literature offers a number of tests for the
presence of asymmetric information in an overall market (see Chiappori and Salanie´ [5]
and Finkelstein and McGarry [16]), but there is no available test at the finer level that we
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require here. We develop a new method to identify binding incentive constraints, based
on the standard qualification requirements in the Lagrangian approach. This methods
shows that in Canada incentive problems only concern those households with negative
consolidated social weights. The consolidated social weights of the rich, old urban families
in West Canada thus underestimate their true underlying intrinsic weights. The size of the
bias is such that their intrinsic weights are positive, even though they remain the main
contributors to redistribution in favor of other groups. This result is more prominent when
the Liberal Party is in power.
The identification of the binding incentive constraints enables us to decompose the dis-
couragement indices (the percentage by which taxes reduce consumption) of the different
categories into the many-person Ramsey rule element from within income class taste hetero-
geneity and the incentive component related to between-income class taste heterogeneity.
We find that the many-person Ramsey rule mostly justifies the tax-free categories whereas
the taxation of Housing expenditures, Recreation and Restaurants reflects incentive con-
cerns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup
with agents differing in two dimensions. The necessary conditions for an optimal tax
system are set out in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes the theoretical part of the paper
by providing the new formulation of these conditions separating equity/efficiency from
incentive considerations. The illustration on Canadian consumption data appears in Section
5. The appendix discusses alternative interpretations of our theoretical framework and
provides various robustness checks of the results presented in the empirical illustration.
2 General setup
We consider a population of agents who differ in terms of their labor skill i (i = 1, . . . , I) and
consumption tastes j (j = 1, . . . , J). There are nij type ij agents and the total population
size is normalized to 1. The preferences of a type-ij agent are represented by the utility
function Ui(Vj(x), y), where x is a bundle of consumption goods, y is a nonnegative real
number which stands for pre-tax labor income, and V is a sub-utility function referring to
consumption. The functions Ui and Vj satisfy the standard monotonicity and convexity
properties.
The government observes individual incomes and the aggregate consumption of each
good, but skill and tastes are agents’ private information. The government can apply non-
linear income taxes and linear consumption taxes. An agent with pre-tax income of y has
post-tax income of R(y). Consumption taxes are given by q − p, where q and p are the
vectors of consumer and producer prices respectively. As is standard, one commodity is
assumed to be untaxed.
Income heterogeneity appears via the income classes k (k = 1, . . . , K). Agents in class
k earn pre-tax income of yk and post-tax income of Rk = R(yk). In what follows we
assume that K ≤ IJ . The limited number of income classes may reflect some exogenous
5
restriction on the number of possible occupations or jobs, as in Diamond [13] and Diamond
and Spinnewijn [15], or, as will become clear below, some endogenous income bunching.1
Given (y,R) a type-ij agent chooses a consumption bundle ξj(q, R) maximizing Vj(x)
subject to the budget constraint q · x ≤ R. The agent obtains (conditional) indirect
subutility Vj(ξj(q, R)) ≡ Vj(q, R) from consumption, with a slight abuse of notation. A
type-ij agent in class k has utility Ui(Vj(q, Rk), yk) and thus self-selects into this class if
and only if
Ui(Vj(q, Rk), yk) ≥ Ui(Vj(q, Rk′), yk′) (1)
for all k′.
A tax system is defined by a vector q of consumer prices, an income tax profile (yk, Rk)
and an allocation rule (µijk), where µijk equals 1 if ij agents are assigned to class k, and 0
otherwise. This satisfies incentive compatibility if (1) holds for each type ij and each pair
of classes k and k′ such that µijk = 1. It is feasible when∑
jk
njk [(q − p) · ξj(q, Rk) + (yk −Rk)] ≥ 0, (2)
where
njk ≡
∑
i
nijµijk
is the number of taste-j agents in class k.
A tax system is (socially) optimal when it maximizes some social objective subject to
the incentive and feasibility constraints (1) and (2). In what follows, the social objective
is assumed to be Paretian, increasing with agents’ utilities.
3 A dual program
It is difficult to deal with the incentive constraints (1) at this level of generality. The
literature usually imposes more structure than just separability on individual preferences,
e.g., some version of the single-crossing condition, to deal with these constraints. It is not
clear how relevant these additional restrictions are in practice. In this section we consider
a ‘reference’ tax system ((µ¯ijk), q¯, (y¯k, R¯k)) satisfying (1) and (2), and derive conditions for
consumer prices q¯ and the post-tax income profile (R¯k) to be optimal given (µ¯ijk) and (y¯k).
This methodology makes additional restrictions on individual preferences unnecessary.
Suppose that the economy is locally non-satiated under the reference tax system: a
small amount of additional resources can be used to achieve a Pareto improvement without
violating the incentive-compatibility requirements. This assumption implies that q¯ and
the profile (R¯k) are part of an optimal tax system only if given (µ¯ijk) and (y¯k) there is
1In the appendix we provide an alternative model abstracting from occupations, where type ij earns
pre-tax income yij but there are exogenous restrictions on the income-tax schedule. This alternative model
yields the same results as those derived in the main text.
6
no q and (Rk) that yield additional tax resources without reducing the welfare of some
agents or violating incentive-compatibility requirements. Consider an alternative tax sys-
tem where indirect taxes are q and post-tax incomes are (Rk), while pre-tax incomes and
the assignment remain as in the reference situation (y¯k) and (µ¯ijk). No agent suffers from
the implementation of this alternative tax system if and only if
Ui(Vj(q, Rk), y¯k) ≥ Ui(Vj(q¯, R¯k), y¯k) (3)
for all ijk such that µ¯ijk = 1.
Suppose now that there is some type-ij agent in occupation k′ (µijk′ = 1) who en-
vies someone in occupation k in the reference situation, that is the incentive constraint
Ui(Vj(q¯, R¯k′), y¯k′) ≥ Ui(Vj(q¯, R¯k), y¯k) holds with equality. Under the alternative tax system
incentive compatibility is preserved if and only if
Ui(Vj(q, Rk′), y¯k′) ≥ Ui(Vj(q, Rk), y¯k).
By (3), a sufficient condition for this inequality to be met is
Ui(Vj(q, Rk), y¯k) ≤ Ui(Vj(q¯, R¯k), y¯k).
Let V¯jk ≡ Vj(q¯, R¯k) stand for the sub-utility of a type-ij agent under the reference tax
system. The reference tax system is optimal only if, given the allocation (µ¯ijk) and pre-tax
income levels (y¯k), the tax tools (q, (Rk)) = (q¯, (R¯k)) maximize total tax resources∑
jk
njk [(q − p) · ξj(q, Rk) + (y¯k −Rk)]
subject to
Vj(q, Rk) ≥ V¯jk (4)
for all ijk such that µ¯ijk = 1, and
Vj(q, Rk) ≤ V¯jk (5)
for all ijk such that Ui(V¯jk, y¯k) = Ui(V¯jk′ , y¯k′) and µ¯ijk′ = 1 for some k
′ 6= k.
We solve this problem using the Lagrangian approach. The reference tax system is
optimal only if (q¯, (R¯k)) is a local extremum of the Lagrangian function∑
jk
njk (t · ξj(q, Rk)−Rk) +
∑
jk
(njkλjk − n˜jkγjk)
[
Vj(q, Rk)− V¯jk
]
,
where
nj ≡
∑
k
njk and n˜jk ≡
∑
i
∑
k′ 6=k
nijµ¯ijk′1
[
Ui(V¯jk′ , y¯k′) = Ui(V¯jk, y¯k)
]
are respectively the number of taste-j agents, and the number of taste-j agents assigned to
class k′ 6= k who contemplate switching to k.
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For the Lagrangian approach to be valid we require the qualification of the active
constraints in the reference situation.
Assumption 1. Qualification requirement. With N taxable consumption goods the JK×
(N +K) Jacobian matrix whose jk-th row is ∇Vj(q¯, R¯k) has rank JK.
Assumption 1 requires that (J−1)K ≤ N , i.e. a large number of taxable goods relative
to agent heterogeneity. This does not seem to be very demanding in practice, as there will
be a large number N of taxable goods, but is likely to be problematic for the empirical
analysis using consumption data where goods are aggregated into only a few categories.
Under Assumption 1 there exist JK non-negative Lagrange multipliers njkλjk − n˜jkγjk
associated with (4) and (5). By convention, we set njkλjk ≥ 0 and n˜jkγjk = 0 when one
such multiplier is non-negative, and n˜jkγjk > 0 and njkλjk = 0 otherwise. This convention
makes clear that for any given jk the only relevant (binding) constraint is (4) if njkλjk ≥ 0
and (5) if n˜jkγjk > 0. Type jk is ‘envied’ (or mimicked) when n˜jkγjk > 0, and is not envied
otherwise.
4 A Many-Person Ramsey Rule
The first-order condition for the consumer price qh to be optimal is, using αjk for the
marginal utility of income of a taste-j agent in class k,
∑
jk
njk
(
ξhjk +
∑
`
t`
∂ξ`jk
∂qh
)
−
∑
jk
(njkλjk − n˜jkγjk)αjkξhjk = 0,
where all of the variables are evaluated under the reference tax system.
Let
βjk =
∑
`
t`
∂ξ`jk
∂R
+ λjkαjk. (6)
stand for the ‘intrinsic’ social weight of one taste-j agent assigned to class k. The intrinsic
social weight measures the marginal social valuation of an income transfer in the absence
of any incentive problems involving this agent.
The same transfer also benefits taste-j agents allocated to another class k′ 6= k when
they switch to k. The impact on the objective of the tightening of the associated incentive
constraint is measured by
β˜jk = γjkαjk. (7)
As a result the total social value of a one-unit income transfer toward each taste-j agent
in class k, which we call the ‘consolidated’ social weight, is
bjk = njkβjk − n˜jkβ˜jk. (8)
This consolidated social weight bjk is equal to the intrinsic social weight of taste-j agents
in class k net of the incentive correction n˜jkβ˜jk.
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Appealing to the Slutsky properties, the first-order condition in qh can be rewritten as
∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
= −ξh +
∑
jk
bjkξ
h
jk (9)
where
ξh ≡
∑
jk
njkξ
h
jk
represents the aggregate demand for good h, and ξˆh is the aggregate compensated demand
for this good. Using the first-order condition in the post-tax income chosen for class k,∑
j
bjk =
∑
j
njk ≡ nk, (10)
the first-order condition in qh finally yields a version of the many-person Ramsey rule that
is set out in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Consider some assignment (µ¯ijk), a
vector of consumer prices q¯ and an income-tax schedule (y¯k, R¯k) that satisfies the incentive-
compatibility and feasibility requirements (1) and (2). Optimal taxes are such that
∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
=
∑
k
nkΦ
h
k (11)
where
Φhk ≡
∑
j
bjk
nk
ξhjk −
∑
j
njk
nk
ξhjk = cov
(
bjk
njk
, ξhjk
)
.
The covariance Φhk is positive when the agents in class k who have high consolidated
social weights like good h. Rule (11) looks like the standard many-person Ramsey rule,
with Φhk being the distributive factor for good h advocated by Diamond [11], here calcu-
lated within income class k. In the typical textbook formulation, however, intrinsic social
weights replace the consolidated social weights. The social weights in (11) underestimate
the true underlying social value of an agent measured by her intrinsic social weight as
income transfers toward agents in class k render this class more desirable to the other
agents, which tightens the incentive constraints. This helps to explain why the empirical
literature has sometimes produced negative estimates of social values consistent with the
many-person Ramsey rule (see, for example, Ahmad and Stern [1]). This literature in fact
has produced estimates of the consolidated social weights, rather than the intrinsic weights,
which explains the discrepancy. We shall return to this point in our illustration.
The expression for the covariance Φhk supposes that every taste j is represented in each
income class k. When njk = 0 for some jk the covariance expression remains valid when no
taste-j agents in income class k′ 6= k contemplate switching to k, as we can then without
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loss of generality set bjk to 0. This argument no longer applies when both njk = 0 for some
jk and some taste-j agents in class k′ 6= k contemplate switching to k. Here the covariance
Φhk involves the hypothetical consumption levels that jk
′ agents would have in class k. In
order to disentangle effective (observed) consumption from the hypothetical consumption
of mimickers we require a more suitable form of (11). Note that
Φhk = cov
(
βjk, ξ
h
jk
)− cov( n˜jk
njk
β˜jk, ξ
h
jk
)
,
where
cov
(
βjk, ξ
h
jk
) ≡ φhk = ∑
j
njk
nk
βjkξ
h
jk −
∑
j
njk
nk
βjk
∑
j
njk
nk
ξhjk (12)
is the distributive factor of good h used by Diamond [11] (here this is calculated in class
k) relying on intrinsic social weights. Similarly,
cov
(
n˜jk
njk
β˜jk, ξ
h
jk
)
=
∑
j
n˜jk
nk
β˜jk
(
ξhjk − ξhk
)
(13)
where
ξhk ≡
∑
j
njk
nk
ξhjk
is the average (actual) demand for good h in class k. A type-ij agent in class k′ 6= k would
have the same consumption ξhjk as the taste-j agents initially assigned to class k. The
covariance in (13) is thus a weighted sum of the differences between the fictive consumption
of good h by agents who contemplate switching to class k and the actual consumption of
this same good by agents who are allocated to class k in the reference situation. This is
the ‘incremental demand of the mimickers’ that appears in Guesnerie [19] and Cremer,
Pestieau and Rochet [9].
Proposition 1 can then be rewritten as follows:
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Consider some assignment (µ¯ijk), a
vector of consumer prices q¯ and an income-tax schedule (y¯k, R¯k) that satisfies the incentive
compatibility and feasibility requirements (1) and (2). Optimal taxes are such that
∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
=
∑
k
nkφ
h
k −
∑
jk
n˜jkβ˜jk
(
ξhjk − ξhk
)
, (14)
where φhk is the within class k distributive factor for good h.
Proposition 2 yields the rules obtained in the previous literature as special cases.
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1. Incentive considerations are irrelevant in the single class K = 1 case, i.e. n˜jkβ˜jk = 0
for all jk. The income tax then degenerates to a uniform lump-sum tax and the rule
given in Proposition 2 can be simplified to
∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
=
∑
k
nkφ
h
k = φ
h
1 .
This coincides with the familiar many-person Ramsey rule (when a uniform income
tax is allowed). The discouragement of the compensated demand for good h should
equal the distributive factor of this good. Indirect taxation is useful as long as there
is taste heterogeneity in the (unique) income class.
2. When there are K = IJ different classes, φhk = 0 for all h and k, and the optimal rule
for indirect taxation given in (14) becomes
∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
= −
∑
jk
n˜jkβ˜jk
(
ξhjk − ξhk
)
. (15)
Discouragement only relies on the incremental net demand of the mimickers, as in
Mirrlees [22], Guesnerie [19], and Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] and [10]. The
formula in equation (15) is of the same kind as those derived by Saez [24] from his
Assumption 3. It also applies in the special case where tastes are perfectly correlated
with skill, as in Golosov, Troshkin, Tsyvinski and Weinzierl [18]. Indirect taxation is
of no use when no agent contemplates switching to another class (n˜jkβ˜jk = 0 for all
jk). Indirect taxation is also of no use in the homogeneous-taste case, Vj(x) = V (x)
for all j, since then ξhjk = ξ
h
k for all j. This is the theorem in Atkinson and Stiglitz [2].
When n˜jkβ˜jk > 0 for some jk, consumption of a given good should be discouraged
when agents who contemplate switching to k have a higher consumption of this good
than the agents who are actually assigned to class k. The role of indirect taxes in
(15) is to relax the incentive constraints, which is possible only if agents in different
income classes also have different tastes, i.e. in the presence of heterogeneity across
income classes.
The considerations resulting from these two polar cases come together in a surprisingly
simple manner in the more general configuration where 1 ≤ K ≤ IJ . Optimal discourage-
ment should then equal the sum of the distributive factors over the different income classes
and a measure of the excess consumption of mimickers.
In each configuration non-linear income taxes address agent heterogeneity across income
classes. Proposition 2 highlights that indirect taxes are useful under two kinds of circum-
stances. First, they help address equity when individuals allocated to the same income
class have different consumption tastes, as they then allow the tax authority to manage
within income class taste heterogeneity. Second, they ensure the relaxation of the incentive
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constraints when individuals who are allocated to different income classes have different
tastes, i.e. when there is between-class taste heterogeneity.
Proposition 2 shows that the considerations from the many-person Ramsey rule should
partly affect indirect taxes. Luxuries should be heavily taxed when the government puts
a high weight on agents who like necessities. Even so, we cannot conclude that indirect
taxes should always serve to reinforce the progressivity of the tax system, with luxuries
being more heavily taxed than necessities. In particular there is pressure for high taxes on
necessities in the redistributive case where agents from the higher income classes have lower
social values and like necessities more than do the less well-off. The signal of a relative
taste for necessities is based on a (fictitious) neutralization of income differences. Through
the incremental net demand of the mimickers, the appraisal of taste heterogeneity across
income classes relies on the comparison of the actual consumption of necessities by the poor
and that by agents who are currently in the upper income class were they to be endowed
with the same income as the poor. The upper income classes like necessities more than do
the less well-off if, when endowed with lower income, they would consume more necessities
than do the poor.
These ideas can be illustrated by a simple example. Consider two income classes, with
some agents earning 20 USD and others 10 USD. There are only two types of tastes,
indexed by Pot and Cav. Pot-taste agents consume only potatoes: each rich (poor) Pot-
taste agent thus spends 20 USD (10 USD) on potatoes. Cav-taste agents with the high 20
USD income only consume caviar, while those in the 10 USD lower income class spread
their 10 USD income evenly between caviar and potatoes. Such tastes could be driven
by some hidden wealth or merely reflect subjective personal preferences. In any case, if
the government favors those who like potatoes, i.e. Pot-taste agents, the many-person
Ramsey rule considerations imply that caviar should be taxed more heavily than potatoes.
Nevertheless heterogeneity across income classes might produce higher taxes on potatoes
if the rich Pot-taste agents envy the poor, since poor Pot-taste agents have greater (10
USD) consumption of potatoes than that of the poor (a poor-population weighted sum of
5 USD and 10 USD). The same argument applies to the taxation of household savings in a
dynamic setup where there is only one consumption good, say potatoes, income is received
at some initial date, and when Pot and Cav are replaced by patient and impatient agents,
respectively. Patient agents prefer the later consumption of potatoes.
In practice it may be difficult to obtain information on the fictitious consumption of
mimickers that is important in the optimal design of indirect taxes. Fictitious consumption
can be identified empirically when taste heterogeneity within each income class is large
enough. This comes about in the examples above (where J = K) and will also hold in our
empirical illustration, where all possible tastes appear in each income class.
5 An empirical illustration
We consider Canadian consumption microdata to provide a decomposition of discourage-
ment in line with that set out in Proposition 2, with a many-person Ramsey component and
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an index for the excess consumption of mimickers. To this end we first reorganize the data
into groups of agents who have similar tastes and estimate the consolidated social values
(bjk) of these groups. We then present a new method for the identification of the relevant
(binding) incentive constraints. This method yields separate estimates for the incentive
corrections (n˜jkβ˜jk) and the intrinsic social weights (βjk). From these estimates we deduce
all of the values of the statistics in Proposition 2.
5.1 Data, consumption and taxes
The main data comes from the Survey of Family Spending (for 1992, 1996, 1997 and 1998)
and the Survey of Household Spending (annually from 1999 to 2008) collected by Statistics
Canada.2 The annual surveys have from 8,624 to 16,461 observations, yielding a 14-year
pooled sample of 183,971 observations at the household level. Each observation contains
information on some observable household characteristics as well as household spending
on 12 aggregate categories of goods based on Classification of Individual Consumption
According to Purpose (COICOP) used by the United Nations.3 The summary statistics
for this sample appear in column 1 of Table 1.
Post-tax price indices come from the Statistics Canada Consumer Price Index. These
are calculated at the category × province × year level and are harmonized across provinces
using the 2008 Inter-city Indices of Consumer Price Levels. Canada has both a federal
Goods and Services Tax (GST) and local commodity taxes. Some provinces set local taxes
in accordance with the GST in the framework of the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). Others
may have provincial or retail sales taxes on top of the GST. In most of this illustration we
focus our attention on federal redistribution. This amounts to taking local taxes as given
and thus ignoring any vertical tax interactions between different government levels. Table 7
in the appendix presents the results based on both federal and local taxes that partially take
into account vertical tax interactions. The federal GST was enacted in 1991 at a rate of 7%
through legislative arrangements promoted by Brian Mulroney and part of the Progressive
Conservative party, but disapproved of by other Right-wing members of Parliament, the
Liberal party and most of the population. The Conservative Party subsequently lowered
the GST rate to 6% in 2006 and 5% in 2008.
Most goods and services are subject to the GST, but some items are zero-rated or tax-
free.4 The excluded items from the GST are concentrated in specific goods and services
categories. However the aggregate COICOP categories include both taxed and tax-free
items. In the absence of more detailed information, our baseline specification considers
2Details regarding this data can be found in Boelaert [4].
3The 12 categories are: Food and non-alcoholic beverages; Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics;
Clothing and footwear; Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; Furnishings, household equipment
and routine household maintenance; Health; Purchase of vehicles, operation of personal transport equip-
ment; Transport services; Communication; Recreation and culture; Education; Restaurants and hotels; and
Miscellaneous goods and services. The United Nations Statistics Division provides detailed information
available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=5&Lg=1.
4These excluded items are listed at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/gm/4-3/4-3-e.html.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Full sample Full sub-sample Final sub-sample1
No. of observations 183,973 100,000 33,025
Urban (ref: Rural) (in percent) 67 67 68
Age (in years) 49.1 49.1 49.1
Income (in CAD) 42,111 42,147 43,621
Family type (ref: Other) (in percent)
Single 25.5 25.5 28.3
Couple with children 30.9 31.1 30.6
Childless couple 25.7 25.5 23.4
Single-parent family 8 7.9 8
Housing tenure (ref: tenancy) (in percent)
Mortgaged owner occupancy 32.9 32.8 34.8
Outright owner occupancy 33.2 33.2 29.9
Education (ref: Primary education) (in percent)
Secondary education 12.4 12.3 11.8
Partial post-secondary education 4.7 4.7 4.7
Complete post-secondary education 7.6 7.7 7.8
Higher education 9.4 9.3 10.4
(Not reported) (56.9) (57) (56.2)
Region (ref: Ontario) (in percent)
Atlantic Canada2 30 29.9 32.7
British Columbia 11.3 11.3 10
Canadian Prairies3 30.5 30.5 32.4
Quebec 14.3 14.4 13.4
Notes: 1. This sub-sample refers only to individuals who are in taste groups 1 to 4.
2. New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia.
3. Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest Territories.
Food, Health, (public and private) Transport and Education as being tax-free. We have
also set a 100% tax rate on Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics. These choices are of
course debatable. In the appendix we assess the robustness of our results to our benchmark
tax base and find no significant impact of departures from these assumptions.
5.2 Revealed-preference taste groups
The identification of the groups of households with the same consumption tastes relies
on the revealed-preference based method recently developed by Crawford and Pendakur
[6]. We use the R algorithm revealedPrefs to cluster the data. This algorithm yields
groups of observations that do not violate the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences.
Households in the same group therefore have the same preferences and demand functions.
The algorithm is computationally very demanding, and we thus work with a random sub-
sample of 100, 000 observations from our initial sample. In line with Crawford and Pendakur
[6], we find that taste heterogeneity does matter, but a small number of groups suffices to
explain the majority of observed consumption behaviour, with only eight taste groups being
required to explain the behaviour in 50% of observations.5 In order to meet the qualification
requirements set out in Assumption 1 we will consider the four taste groups with the most
observations, i.e. we set J = 4. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 present the summary statistics
of the 100,000 observation sample and the subsample in these four taste groups (which
cover one-third of households). This latter is fairly representative of the full sample.
The taste groups are unbalanced in size. The first includes twice as many household
observations as any of the other three: there are 12, 555 observations in taste-group 1,
6, 883 in group 2, 7, 441 in group 3 and 6, 146 in group 4. The detailed characteristics
of the different groups appear in Table 2. Taste-group 1 comprises better-educated and
richer households than the other groups, but otherwise the observable characteristics in
taste groups 1 and 3 are very similar. Both consist of young rural households living in
East Canada (Quebec and the Atlantic regions). Households in taste groups 2 and 4 are
older and live instead in Western Canada. Table 6 shows the consumption spending of the
different taste groups.
5.3 Social-weight estimates
Assuming that the GST rates are set optimally, the best estimates for the social weights
(bjk) must satisfy (9) and (10). The first-order condition (9) associated with category h
can be rewritten as ∑
`
t`
q`
εˆh` = −1 +
∑
jk
bjk
ξhjk
ξh
, (16)
5We find that 18 taste groups explain 75% of the data, and 79 groups are required to explain the whole
100,000 observation dataset.
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Table 2: Crawford-Pendakur taste groups
(ref: Taste group 4) Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3
Urban (ref: Rural) −0.11∗ −0.0003 −0.11∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Age (in logs) −0.17∗∗ −0.06 −0.24∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Income (in logs) 0.11∗∗ −0.03 0.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Family type (ref: Other)
Single 0.07 0.08 −0.06
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Couple with children 0.03 −0.01 −0.02
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Childless couple 0.05 −0.02 −0.13
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Single-parent family 0.04 −0.06 −0.17
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Housing tenure (ref: tenancy)
Mortgaged owner occupancy −0.33∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Outright owner occupancy 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Education (ref: Primary education)
Secondary education 0.03 −0.04 0.002
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Partial post-secondary education 0.07 −0.11 0.02
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Complete post-secondary education 0.17∗∗ 0.02 0.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Higher education 0.18∗∗ 0.03 0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Region (ref: Ontario)
Atlantic Canada1 0.46∗∗∗ −0.01 0.67∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
British Columbia −0.03 −0.03 −0.19∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Canadian Prairies2 0.20∗∗∗ −0.12 −0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Quebec 0.28∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant −0.08 0.63 −0.01
(0.57) (0.65) (0.65)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 38,692.84 38,692.84 38,692.84
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
1. New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia
2. Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest Territories
where
εˆh` =
∑
jk
njk
ξhjk
ξh
εˆh`jk
is the price elasticity of the compensated aggregate demand for category h with respect to
consumer price q`, and
εˆh`jk =
q`
ξhjk
∂ξˆhjk
∂q`
is the price elasticity of the compensated demand for category h with respect to consumer
price q` by a taste-j agent in income class k. From (10), we have
b1k =
∑
j
njk −
∑
j≥2
bjk ≡ nk −
∑
j≥2
bjk (17)
for all k. Replacing b1k in (16) by its expression given in (17), the best estimate (b
∗
jk) of
the consolidated social weights of taste groups j ≥ 2 is a profile (bjk) minimizing(∑
`
t`
q`
εˆh` + 1−
∑
k
nk
qhξh1k
qhξh
−
∑
k
∑
j≥2
bjk
qhξhjk − qhξh1k
qhξh
)2
. (18)
The best estimate (b∗1k) for taste group 1 is then obtained from (17).
The data provides us with qhξhjk for all j, k and h. The movements in price from changes
in the Consumer Price Index over time and provinces are insufficient to yield convincing
estimates of the cross-price effects in a full AIDS formulation. In the context of this
illustration we have thus neglected the Marshallian cross-price effects. This is certainly
not entirely satisfactory. The price elasticity of compensated demand is derived from a
QUAIDS specification with no cross-price effects. The budget share whs of category h is
whs = αj + γ
h
j
qh
Ps
+ βhj log
(
Rs
Ps
)
+ λhj log
(
Rs
Ps
)2
+ εs
for agent s in taste-group j, with Ps being a (personalized) Stone price index. For all
taste groups the Marshallian own price and income effects are significant for most goods
categories and are of the same order of magnitude as those found in the existing literature.
In equation (18) the taxes t` are excise taxes. The conversion into ad valorem taxes
implies the replacement of t`/q` by t`/(1 + t`).6 In our illustration t` is set to the mean
GST rate over time.
6Let p` be the producer price of good `. Formula (18) considers excise taxes, so that q` = p` + t`. Let
t`adv be the ad valorem GST tax rate. We have q
` = (1 + t`adv)p
`. Therefore
p` + t` = (1 + t`adv)p
` ⇔ t`adv =
t`
p`
=
t`
q`
(1 + t`adv).
From now on, with a slight abuse of notation, t`adv is denoted by t
`.
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We choose as our benchmark K = 2 income classes comprising households whose income
(total expenditure) is above or below median Canadian income. Annual income is between
309 and 35, 232 CAD in the bottom income class, and between 35, 232 and 354, 206 CAD
in the upper class. In the appendix we consider a three income-class economy. The two
class setup seems to reduce the redistributive stance toward the poor.
With J = 4 different tastes and K = 2 income classes we have eight different groups
characterized by their tastes j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and their income class k = 1, 2. We disregard
the first-order condition (9) associated with Alcohol since alcohol taxes likely depend on
other considerations, such as public health, than just efficiency/equity. The qualification
requirements are thus satisfied, with (J − 1)K = 6 being less than N = 11 (the twelve
COICOP categories minus Alcohol).
Table 3 shows for every jk the ratio b∗jk/njk obtained from (17) and (18). This ratio
measures the gross social value (in CAD) of a one CAD transfer to a household in the jk
group. When such a transfer is socially profitable this is greater than 1. The first row of
Table 3 presents the best estimates of these ratios. The main lesson from this exercise is
that tastes matter: redistribution goes from taste-group 2 to taste-groups 1 and 4. The
consolidated weight on the upper class of taste-group 2 even turns out to be negative. In
two taste groups a greater weight is put on the rich.
Table 3: Consolidated social weights
b∗jk/njk (in CAD)
Taste group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Full sample 1.054 1.514 0.178 -0.642 0.608 1.739 2.383 0.964
Conservative Party 1.044 1.496 0.197 -0.562 0.625 1.701 2.361 0.954
Liberal Party 1.097 1.554 0.146 -0.786 0.564 1.793 2.384 0.981
In the second and third rows of Table 3 the tax rate is set to the mean GST rate in
the years when the Prime Minister is from the Conservative Party (1993, 2006, 2007, and
2008) and from the Liberal Party (1992, and every year from 1996 to 2005), respectively.
The same general pattern holds as in the full sample. The Liberal Party puts more weight
on taste group 1; it also seems to relatively penalize rich taste-2 agents and favor the upper
income classes within the other taste groups.
5.4 Incentive patterns and intrinsic social values
We know from Proposition 2 that the weights in Table 3 may yield a biased view of the
federal government’s underlying preferences. The intrinsic social weights (measured by βjk)
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will only be equal to bjk/njk if group jk is not envied by any other group (n˜jkβ˜jk is zero in
(8)).
In this section we provide a simple argument that allows us to identify the relevant
(binding) incentive constraints. This argument is based on the qualification requirements
made in Assumption 1, which imply that λjk ≥ 0, n˜jkβ˜jk ≥ 0 and n˜jkβ˜jkλjk = 0 for all jk.
From (6), (7) and (8) we have
njk
∑
`
t`
∂ξ`jk
∂Rk
− bjk = n˜jkβ˜jk − njkαjkλjk. (19)
It follows that
njk
∑
`
t`
∂ξ`jk
∂Rk
− bjk > 0⇔ n˜jkβ˜jk > 0.
Table 4 presents the estimated values of the left-hand side of (19) with bjk replaced
by b∗jk and calculating the income effects consistent with the QUAIDS formulation.
7 If
positive, this provides an estimate of n˜∗jkβ˜
∗
jk for n˜jkβ˜jk. In this case we consider that jk
agents are envied, with a binding incentive constraint involving group jk (n˜jkβ˜jk ≥ 0).
Taste-j agents in occupation k are envied by taste-j agents in occupation k′ 6= k. If, on
the other hand, the estimate n˜∗jkβ˜
∗
jk turns out to be negative, jk agents are not envied, i.e.
the incentive constraints involving group jk are considered to be slack (n˜jkβ˜jk = 0).
Table 4: Incentive corrections
n˜∗jkβ˜
∗
jk (in CAD)
Taste group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample -0.198 -0.270 -0.014 0.072 -0.064 -0.188 -0.201 -0.092
Conservative Party -0.196 -0.267 -0.016 0.064 -0.066 -0.184 -0.200 -0.091
Liberal Party -0.205 -0.277 -0.010 0.088 -0.058 -0.193 -0.201 -0.094
Table 4 shows that incentive considerations only matter within taste group 2, where
the upper class is envied by the (taste-2) poor. When the incentive constraint binds for a
7The conversion to ad valorem taxes yields
n˜∗jkβ˜
∗
jk = njk
∑
`
t`
1 + t`
q`ξ`jk
Rjk
∂ log ξ`jk
∂ logRjk
− b∗jk.
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group jk, from (6) the intrinsic social weight is8
βjk =
∑
`
t`
∂ξ`jk
∂Rk
.
Applying this correction yields the intrinsic social weights given in Table 5. A group is
Table 5: Intrinsic social weights
βjk (in CAD)
Taste group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample 1.054 1.514 0.178 0.047 0.608 1.739 2.383 0.964
Conservative Party 1.044 1.496 0.197 0.045 0.625 1.701 2.361 0.954
Liberal Party 1.097 1.554 0.146 0.051 0.564 1.793 2.384 0.981
socially favored when βjk > 1 and socially penalized otherwise. The redistribution present
in federal taxation suggests that social preferences are more intricate than is generally
assumed in the theoretical literature. The taste-4 poor and the rich in the taste groups 1
and 3 appear to be socially favored at the expense of the entire taste-2 group. This pattern
seems to be magnified when the Liberals are in power.
The appendix provides a number of robustness checks of these results. The redistribu-
tion pattern in Table 5 continues to hold with different tax bases and tax rates. It also
holds after controlling for household size. It is nevertheless qualitatively sensitive to the
rough split into two income classes. With three income classes the anti-redistributive pat-
tern in Table 5 disappears, with redistribution going from the taste-2 group to the taste-1
poor and taste 3 and 4 middle classes. The rich are always assigned a lower intrinsic social
weight than are the poor and/or the middle class.
5.5 Discouragement and incentives
The intrinsic social weights in Table 5 matter in the many-person Ramsey rule component,
while the incentive corrections in Table 4 allow us to calculate the contribution of the
incremental net demand of mimickers. We are thus in a position to decompose the actual
discouragement for each category of goods, as in Proposition 2.
8For ad valorem taxes this equation is rewritten as
βjk =
∑
`
t`
1 + t`
q`ξ`jk
Rjk
∂ log ξ`jk
∂ logRjk
.
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As expected, the demand for taxed COICOP categories is found to be discouraged
by the tax system while the demand for the tax-free categories is encouraged. The third
row of Table 6 shows the contribution of the many-person Ramsey rule component to the
discouragement for each category of goods. The largest many-person Ramsey contributions
are found for the tax-free categories, suggesting that it is redistributive concerns that mostly
justify these exemptions. As the taste-1 group has the most observations, the many-person
Ramsey rule component is likely driven by the consumption profile of this group. Society
is neutral with respect to the poor in this taste group but favors the rich. Food indeed
appears to be encouraged, as upper income class taste-1 households consume relatively
more food. The same applies for the Transport, Health and Education categories.
The smallest contributions obtain for Housing (the largest expenditure category) and,
to a lesser extent, Recreation and culture, and Restaurants and hotels. Since taste-2
households in the upper class are the only ones who are mimicked, the relevant incremental
net demand of the mimickers comes from lower-class taste-2 households. The consumption
pattern of upper income class taste-2 households coincides with the consumption that
would be chosen by a currently lower income class taste-2 household if endowed with a
higher income. The upper income class taste-2 consumption of Housing, Recreation and
Restaurants is indeed about 3% higher than the corresponding average expenditure of the
rich. Discouraging the consumption of these categories is therefore one way to alleviate
incentive issues within taste-2 households. On the contrary, when these households have
consumption similar to the average expenditure of the rich, the decomposition in (14)
implies that discouragement is mainly driven by the many-person Ramsey rule component.
This is what happens in the Communication category.
Table 6: Discouragement decomposition
Food Alc Cloth Hous Equi Health Trans Com Rec Educ Rest Misc
Expenditures (as a percent of total income) 10.8 2.3 5.4 21.7 7.4 2.2 17 2.6 8.5 1.3 4.6 16.2
Discouragement index (in percent) 0.7 -24 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 2.7 1.1 -0.3 -0.35 2.8 -0.4 -0.23
Many-person contribution (in percent) 93 66 1 24 87 59 98 10 78 4 69
Lower income class
(†) Mean household expenditure (CAD) 3,097 639 899 5,596 1,316 595 2,306 695 1,254 112 775 2,644
Taste 1 (39%)1 basis (†) 97.82 92.9 98 100 96.9 100 95.1 98.5 96.3 96.6 99.2 97.5
Taste 2 (21%) basis (†) 99.1 95.8 98.9 99 99.3 95.4 100.1 97.6 100.6 109.9 96 98.3
Taste 3 (23%) basis (†) 104.3 100 109.1 91.2 108.6 105.4 109.6 102.9 109.1 99.4 103 108.1
Taste 4 (17%) basis (†) 100.2 121.3 93.7 112.1 96.4 97.9 98.2 102.3 95.6 96.5 102.4 96.9
Higher income class
(‡) Mean household expenditure (CAD) 6,364 1,333 3,771 13,347 5,183 1,297 12,506 1,538 6,198 1,031 3,263 11,486
Taste 1 (37%) basis (‡) 101.2 98.3 104.1 99.7 103 106.4 104.2 102 102.2 106.5 102.4 104.5
Taste 2 (21%) basis (‡) 100.6 96 100.6 103 102.2 96.2 96.1 100 103.5 95.1 103.3 98.4
Taste 3 (22%) basis (‡) 99.6 101.2 100.8 94.8 100.3 102.7 95.4 99.1 102.5 100.5 98.2 100.9
Taste 4 (20%) basis (‡) 97.7 106.1 90.9 103.1 91.9 89.2 101.6 97.3 89.6 92.8 94.3 92.4
Notes: 1. Taste-1 households represent 39% of the lower income class.
2. Mean household taste-1 food expenditure represents 97.8% of 3, 097 CAD (†).
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A Restricted income tax
This appendix provides an alternative model where agents may earn different incomes in
the reference situation, so that we can actually dispense from the existence of a limited
number of income classes or from bunching in the reference situation, and allow for greater
income heterogeneity, if we are ready to accept an ad hoc restriction on the way in which
income taxes and transfers can be adjusted. All the results of the paper remain unchanged.
Suppose that the government can use at most K different taxes (T1, . . . , TK), with K ≤ IJ
exogeneously given. Propositions 1 and 2 apply provided that an income class is thought
of as a group of agents with possibly different pre-tax incomes but confronted with the
same taxes. Let yijk be the pre-tax income of an agent ij who faces tax Tk so that she
has post-tax income yijk − Tk. Her consumption is ξj(q, yijk − Tk) and she obtains utility
Ui(Vj(q, yijk − Tk), yijk).
The incentive-compatibility constraints for ij agents facing taxes Tk are
Ui(Vj(q, yijk − Tk), yijk) ≥ Ui(Vj(q, yi′j′k′ − Tk′), yi′j′k′)
for all i′j′k′. Consider a situation where these constraints are satisfied. Given (y¯ijk) these
constraints are also satisfied in any tax system (q, (Tk)) that leaves V¯ijj′k ≡ Vj(q¯, y¯ij′k− T¯k)
unchanged for all ijj′k.
Optimal taxes (q, (Tk)) maximize∑
ijk
nijµ¯ijk [(q − p) · ξj(q, y¯ijk − Tk) + Tk]
subject to
Vj(q, y¯ijk − Tk) ≥ V¯ijjk
for all ijk such that µ¯ijk = 1, and
Vj(q¯, y¯ij′k − T¯k) ≤ V¯ijj′k
for all ijj′k, such that there is some type i′j facing taxes T¯k′ in the reference situation such
that Ui′(V¯i′jjk′ , y¯i′jk′) = Ui′(V¯ijj′k, y¯ij′k).
When all agents of the same type face the same tax, there are IJ2 active constraints
in the program. Qualification now requires IJ2 < K +N , which is much more demanding
than in the setup used the main text.9 If this inequality is satisfied, then Propositions 1
and 2 are unchanged, with an income class defined as a group of agents facing the same
taxes. The same argument applies in the more plausible situation where any income falling
in a given bracket is associated with a given amount of tax.
9A similar alternative setup that is less demanding in terms of qualification requirements but still
accommodating greater income heterogeneity than in the main text is one where pre-tax income does not
depend on consumption tastes. When the pre-tax income of a type ij facing tax Tk is yik (so that labor
skills influence labor income) a similar argument yields Propositions 1 and 2 provided that IJ < K +N .
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B Robustness checks for the illustration
B.1 Tax base and tax rates
In the main text we considered Food, Health, and Transport and Education to be tax-free.
However these broad categories certainly consist of some taxed items. Transport comprises
both public-transport services and private transport, and this last sub-category includes
gasoline items which are heavily taxed. Table 7 shows that the intrinsic weights are roughly
unchanged when the whole Transport category is considered to be taxed.
Table 7: GST tax on the Transport category
βjk (in CAD)
Taste-group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income-class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample 1.079 1.460 0.055 0.062 0.062 2.291 3.587 0.496
Conservative Party 1.069 1.446 0.052 0.059 0.082 2.212 3.475 0.512
Liberal Party 1.114 1.494 0.059 0.068 0.066 2.406 3.747 0.467
We have also considered a second variant on the tax base where all categories are
uniformly subject to the GST (except Alcohol). Table 8 shows that the intrinsic social
weights become closer to 1, i.e. redistributive concerns from indirect taxes tend to vanish.
Note however the persistence of a high social value on the lower income class taste-4 group.
Table 8: Uniform tax base
βjk (in CAD)
Taste-group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income-class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample 0.879 1.147 0.902 1.008 0.898 0.923 1.528 0.807
Conservative Party 0.885 1.150 0.900 1.009 0.891 0.919 1.525 0.805
Liberal Party 0.868 1.144 0.923 1.008 0.898 0.926 1.530 0.809
We have also looked at the sensitivity of our results to changes in tax rates. In the
main text we considered that the federal level takes local taxes as given. If we instead
assume that the federal stance takes into account the change in local commodity taxes that
results from any change to the GST rate, for instance through the (HST) harmonization
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settlement, then the sum of the federal and provincial tax rates is better suited for the
analysis. The total commodity tax rate is the GST rate in Alberta, Yukon, Northwest
Territories and Nunavut, it is the sum of the GST and a Provincial rate (PST) in British
Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the sum of the GST and the Quebec Sales Tax
(QST) in Quebec, while the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) applies in other provinces.10
The current total tax rates range from 5% (in provinces and territories where only the
GST applies) to 14.975% in Quebec and 15% in Nova Scotia. The results with the GST
rate replaced by the total (federal and provincial) tax rate appear in Table 9, the tax
base being that used in the main text. The general flavor of the results does not change.
Incentive issues are still concentrated within taste-group 2. They now expand to the lower
income class of this group, which has a small positive incentive correction. Note that the
correction reported in Table 4 for the taste-2 poor was negative but very close to zero.
Table 9: Total federal and provincial taxes
Taste-group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income-class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Consolidated social weights b∗jk/njk (in Canadian Dollars)
Full sample 1.303 1.808 -0.216 -1.836 0.306 2.261 2.692 1.100
Conservative Party 1.256 1.781 -0.195 -1.766 0.335 2.249 2.735 1.088
Liberal Party 1.291 1.825 -0.253 -1.967 0.272 2.354 2.806 1.103
Incentive correction n˜∗jkβ˜
∗
jk (in Canadian Dollars)
Full sample -0.241 -0.319 0.030 0.201 -0.026 -0.242 -0.226 -0.103
Conservative Party -0.232 -0.314 0.028 0.194 -0.029 -0.241 -0.229 -0.102
Liberal Party -0.238 -0.321 0.034 0.215 -0.022 -0.252 -0.235 -0.103
Intrinsic social weights βjk (in Canadian Dollars)
Full sample 1.303 1.808 0.073 0.078 0.306 2.261 2.692 1.100
Conservative Party 1.256 1.781 0.071 0.075 0.335 2.249 2.735 1.088
Liberal Party 1.291 1.825 0.076 0.081 0.272 2.354 2.806 1.103
B.2 Equivalence-scale adjustment
In the main text the social weights were estimated at the household level without any
adjustment for family size. A larger weight on some group could therefore simply reflect
there being more people in the household in this group. Table 10 shows the average
number of consumption units in each household group;11 it also includes the social weights
10See http://www.taxtips.ca/salestaxes/salestaxrates.htm for detailed information.
11Statistics Canada refers to the Low Income Measure (LIM) equivalence scale where the oldest person
in the family has a factor of 1, all other members aged 16 and over each a factor of 0.4, and those under
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and incentive corrections given in Table 7 divided by the average number of consumption
units. In our sample there are 1.3 consumption units in poor households, with an analogous
figure of 1.75 in rich households. Again the general flavor of the results in Table 7 remains
unchanged, though the lower size of poor households (mechanically) pushes redistribution
toward these households.
Table 10: Equivalence-scale adjustment
Taste-group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income-class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Number of consumption units 1.28 1.74 1.29 1.74 1.30 1.73 1.26 1.72
Full sample 0.858 0.877 0.147 0.027 0.450 0.989 1.817 0.560
Conservative Party 0.811 0.862 0.170 0.026 0.491 0.979 1.841 0.558
Liberal Party 0.825 0.891 0.102 0.029 0.441 1.058 1.960 0.569
B.3 Social weights in the whole population
So far we have restricted our attention to the four taste groups with the most observations,
which represent one-third of the full sample. The estimated social weights in Table 5 are
therefore valid under the assumption that the federal government does not care about
the rest of the population when setting GST rates. This is too extreme a position. The
qualification requirements prevent us from taking into account every taste group. A possible
ad hoc way to deal with the whole population is to bundle the rest of the population into a
fifth taste group. We have then (J − 1)K = 8 < N = 11 so that qualification requirements
are still met. This bundling yields the social weights reported in Table 11. The government
actually appears neutral about the rest of the population (which group has associated
intrinsic social weights around 1). Since the total weight of each income class is fixed by the
first-order conditions (10), there must be some reallocation of the social weights across the
most populated taste groups. However the general insights from our baseline specification
are still valid. Taste-group 2 is socially penalized, but the beneficiaries from redistribution
in taste-groups 1, 3 and 4 change. The pattern of binding incentive constraints is not
affected by the presence of the rest of the population whenever the incentive correction is
far enough from 0 in Table 4. As was observed following a change in tax rates, a slight
instability in the pattern of the relevant incentive constraints occurs when the incentive
correction is close to 0 in Table 4. This implies discontinuous changes in the intrinsic social
weights.
age 16 a factor of 0.3.
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Table 11: Social weights from the full sample
Taste-group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4 Rest of the population
Income-class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Consolidated weight 2.448 0.578 0.523 0.581 -1.122 1.707 -1.339 1.729 1.215 0.971
Incentive correction -0.160 -0.031 -0.017 -0.018 0.046 -0.059 0.040 -0.055 -0.385 -0.314
Intrinsic weight 2.448 0.578 0.523 0.581 0.052 1.707 0.044 1.729 1.215 0.971
B.4 Income heterogeneity
Our two income-class setup keeps the presentation simple but is not able to capture the
particular consumption patterns of households at the lower and upper bounds of the income
distribution. We have carried out a number of experiments with three income classes.
When K = 3 the qualification requirements are still met, (J − 1)K = 9 being less than
the number N = 11 of taxable goods (recall that alcohol taxes are not taken into account
as they probably reflect considerations other than equity and efficiency). The results in
Table 12 pertain when we separate the very rich households in the top 5 percent of the
income distribution from two other equal-size income classes. Income in the lower class is
under 33, 498 CAD while it is over 108, 033 CAD in the upper class. Otherwise we use our
baseline specification yielding Tables 3 to 5 in the main text, i.e. the full (Conservatives
and Liberals) sample with tax rates set to the mean GST rate. Redistribution still appears
to penalize the taste-2 group and incentive issues are still found only for this taste group.
Unlike the two-class variant in Table 4, each income class in the taste-2 group is now
envied. In the three-class economy it is no longer possible to identify taste-2 mimickers.
One central insight from this finer income class decomposition is that the anti-redistributive
motive in Table 5 disappears. The high intrinsic social weight of households with above-
median income is now spread out over all three classes: the weight of the households whose
income is above but close to the median is partly imputed to the lower income class, while
the weight put on the very rich remains in the upper class. The impact of this reallocation
is clear: most of the weight in the taste-1 group now goes to the poor, while it goes to the
middle class in taste-groups 3 and 4. This reveals that a high weight is indeed put on the
median income in taste-group 1. On the contrary, the weight is on upper income deciles in
taste groups 3 and 4 (though the very rich in these last two groups are slightly penalized).
These three groups are the main beneficiaries of redistribution.
The three income class setup modifies the decomposition of discouragement into the
many-person Ramsey rule and the incremental net demand of the mimickers contribu-
tions. Among the tax-free categories, Food and Education discouragement remains mostly
explained by equity/efficiency considerations, while about half of Health and Transport
discouragement can now be attributed to the incentive component. Among the taxed cat-
egories, Housing and Recreation are still the categories with the smallest equity/efficiency
contribution to discouragement. The detailed results are not reported here.
A finer income class decomposition tends to reduce taste heterogeneity within each
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Table 12: Ends against the middle
Taste-group j Taste 1 Taste 2 Taste 3 Taste 4
Income-class k Lower1 Middle Upper2 Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper
No. of observations 6,144 5,708 703 3,223 3,301 359 3,602 3,524 315 2,718 3,153 275
No. of consumption units (per household) 1.271 1.703 1.890 1.274 1.716 1.888 1.287 1.701 1.928 1.253 1.697 1.869
Consolidated weight (per household) 2.174 0.860 1.577 -0.807 -0.791 -0.363 0.701 2.161 1.765 0.885 1.830 0.428
Incentive correction -0.396 -0.141 -0.033 0.083 0.084 0.004 -0.071 -0.226 -0.016 -0.069 -0.171 -0.003
Intrinsic weight (per household) 2.174 0.860 1.577 0.045 0.047 0.045 0.701 2.161 1.765 0.885 1.830 0.428
Intrinsic weight (per individual) 1.711 0.505 0.834 0.036 0.028 0.024 0.545 1.270 0.915 0.706 1.079 0.229
Notes: 1 Income below 33, 498 CAD.
2 Income above 108, 033 CAD.
income class and thus could restrict the importance of Ramsey considerations. To assess
the strength of Ramsey considerations with finer income classes we considered income
quintiles and treated the bottom and top income deciles separately, yielding 6 income
classes. To fit the qualification requirements we focus on the two most populated taste
groups j = 1, 2. The different social weights and incentive corrections appear in Table
13. Incentive issues do not matter within taste-group 1; they do however matter within
taste-group 2, where most households are involved in binding incentive constraints (the
incentive correction is either positive or negative and close to 0, apart from the 30 − 50
median quintile). The resulting Ramsey considerations in optimal discouragement are in
fact more balanced across the different categories of goods than in Table 6, ranging from
49% for Restaurants to 90% for Food. The highest Ramsey contributions apply to the
tax-free categories. These results are consistent with those reported in the main text.
Table 13: Finer income class decomposition
Taste-group j Taste 1 Taste 2
Income quantile k 0− 10 10− 30 30− 50 50− 70 70− 90 90− 100 0− 10 10− 30 30− 50 50− 70 70− 90 90− 100
Consolidated weight 1.861 3.164 0.454 1.262 1.045 1.022 -0.569 -3.461 1.991 0.555 0.923 0.959
Incentive correction -0.117 -0.420 -0.052 -0.153 -0.126 -0.064 0.022 0.229 -0.138 -0.038 -0.065 -0.032
Intrinsic weight 1.861 3.164 0.454 1.262 1.045 1.022 0.041 0.043 1.991 0.555 0.923 0.959
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